CASE: MONELL
v DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
436 U.S. 658, 56 L Ed 2d 611, 98 S Ct 2018 (1978)
(U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting all fifty states)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Pregnant employees were compelled to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) Local governing bodies could be sued directly for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief where the action that was alleged to be unconstitutional implemented a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted by that body’s officers, or where constitutional deprivations were visited pursuant to governmental “custom”, even though such custom had not received formal approval through the body’s decision making channels.
2) A municipality cannot be held liable solely because its employees a “tortfeasor.”
CASE: GRANDSTAFF
v CITY OF BORGER, TEXAS
(Fifth Cir. 1985) 767 F. 2d 161 (1985)
(U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit: Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Officers mistook an innocent victim for a fugitive and killed him.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) The City Police Chief took no steps to correct the conduct of officers as to the use of deadly force, which established a policy of “reckless disregard” for human life and safety prevalent among officers, i.e. ratifying a bad shooting.
2) Prior incidents of abusive police conduct tend to prove a pattern or custom and accession to that custom by city policymaker.
3) Where police officers know at the time they act that their use of force is in conscious disregard of rights and safety of innocent third parties will meet with approval of city policymakers, then an affirmative link between the occurrence of various incidents of police misconduct and adoption of plan or policy showing authorization or approval of such misconduct by the city is satisfactory, and the city is liable.
4) Where the city policymaker knows or should know that the city’s police officers are endangering innocent third parties, the city is liable when the inevitable occurs and officers do so.
CASE: CITY
OF LOS ANGELES v HELLER
475 US 796, 89 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1986)
(U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting all fifty states)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Suspect claimed he was arrested without probable cause and he was the victim of excessive force in the making of the arrest.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) In a bifurcated trial, first hearing the claims against the police officer, the jury returned a verdict for the officer.
2) The court dismissed the action against the city and officials, concluding there could be no basis for their liability if the jury had exonerated the officer.
3) The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the jury’s negative finding was conclusive not only to the officer, but also to the city and its officials, who were sued only because they were thought legally responsible for the officer’s action.
4) None of the Supreme Court’s cases authorize an award of damages against a municipal corporation based on the actions of one of its officers when the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm, and the fact that departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force was beside the point.
CASE: CITY
OF CANTON, OHIO v HARRIS
489 US 378, 103 L Ed 2d 412, 109 S Ct 1197 (1989)
(U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting all fifty states).
INITIAL CLAIM:
Suspect in custody was denied medical attention.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) A municipality may be held liable for violation of rights, which violations result from a municipality’s failure to adequately train its employees, only if that failure reflects a “deliberate indifference” on the part of the municipal policy.
2) The “deliberate indifference” standard:
Failure to train may be fairly said to represent a policy for which the municipality is responsible, and for which it may be held liable where injury results, if, in the light of the duties assigned to specific officers, the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that municipal policymakers can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent. (i.e. canine or any other specialty unit/individual.)
CASE: DAVIS
v MASON COUNTY
927 F. 2d 1473 (Ninth Cir. 1991)
(U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Northern Marina Islands, Nevada, Oregon, Pacific Islands and Washington)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Excessive use of force used while arresting citizens.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) The County Sheriff was the official policymaker regarding law enforcement practices, even though he did not have final authority over all training of officers.
2) The County’s failure to adequately train its deputies was “deliberate indifference” and the Sheriff Department’s “Field Training Program” for deputies, although apparently adequate on paper, was never followed in practice.
3) The training that the deputies received was “woefully inadequate,” if it can be said to have existed at all.
4) The issue is not whether the officers had received any training – most of the deputies involved had some training, even it if was minimal at best – rather the issue is the adequacy of that training.
CASE: UNITED
STATES v REESE
(Ninth Cir. 1993) 2 F. 3d 870 (1993)
(U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Northern Mariana Islands, Nevada, Oregon, Pacific Islands and Washington)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Excessive force used to take suspect into custody.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) Arrestees or detainees have a right to be protected by a police supervisor from assaults perpetrated by inferior officers at the scene.
2) Criminal liability for violation of civil rights may be predicated upon mere failure to act to protect an arrestee or detainee from the harm at the hands of other law enforcement officers.
3) A police sergeant who stands by and watches while officers under his command use excessive force and refuses to order them to stop, may thereby subject the victim to loss of his or her right to be kept free from harm while in official custody or detention for purposes of criminal prosecution for violation of civil rights.
4) Police use of force will now be judged using the GRAHAM standard of “objective reasonableness.”
CASE: PRIESTER
v CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA
208 F. 3d 919 (Eleventh Circuit, 2000)
(U.S. Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit: Alabama, Florida and Georgia)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Excessive force, a Police Service Dog bite, used to take a suspect into custody.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) A police officer can be liable for failing to intervene when another officer uses excessive force.
2) If a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation, such as ordering a police dog to attack a compliant suspect, takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable.
3) This liability, however, only arises when an officer is in a position to intervene and fails to do so.
CASE: SAUCIER
v KATZ
150 L Ed 2d 272 (U. S. Supreme Court, 2001)
(U.S. Supreme Court decision affecting all fifty states.)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Excessive force used to take a suspect into custody.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) Officers may be protected under the doctrine of “qualified immunity” and therefore may be entitled to have a case dismissed without the necessity of a trial.
2) “Qualified Immunity” is defined as immunity from civil liability for public officials who are performing discretionary functions, as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.
3) The court set forth a two-part test for determining whether an officer charged with the use of excessive force is entitled to “qualified immunity.”
In applying this two-part test, the Judge assumes the excessive force violations are true (the facts most favorable to the plaintiff).
4) The first part of inquiry is whether a federal constitutional right was violated.
5) The second part of inquiry is whether the constitutional right was clearly established.
6) If an officer’s mistake as to what the law required, with respect to the force used to make an arrest was reasonable, then the officer is entitled to the defense of “qualified immunity.”
Note: This case expresses a principle that not every constitutional violation by officers will subject him to civil liability in a federal civil rights suit.
Knowing canine case law and following it, is still the best way to minimize civil and criminal liability.
(See: Skylstad v Reynolds)
CASE: SKYLSTAD v REYNOLDS
248 Fed. Appx. 808 (U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit 2007)
(U.S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit: Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Northern Marina Islands, Nevada, Oregon, Pacific Islands and Washington)
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this canine case. The court’s decision was without a published opinion. Technically, this means the court’s rulings, findings and comments cannot be used or referred to in other cases.
Even with this decision without published opinion, the case may be referred to when certain matters of law are pointed out by the Ninth Circuit.
The unpublished decision found use of the canine was not excessive force.
INITIAL CLAIM:
1. Excessive force used to take a suspect into custody.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1. The court evaluated the elements in Graham v Connor:
a) The severity of the crime at issue;
b) Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of law enforcement officers or others;
c) And whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
2. The court also evaluated the Summary Judgment in favor of Police Officer Reynolds:
a. The undisputed evidence establishes that Skylstad was the driver of the car that had been, only minutes before, involved in a prolonged and dangerous high-speed chase through residential areas of Spokane.
b. The severity of the crimes of driving at high speeds through residential areas cannot be understated. The car and driver posed an immediate, serious threat to officers and others.
c. Declarations from officers on the scene unanimously state that Skylstad refused to exit the car and violently resisted arrest.
d. Skylstad states that he voluntarily surrendered, that the officers unnecessarily used a K-9 dog to repeatedly bite and attack him.
e. The medical evidence, however, directly contradicts Skylstad’s version of events. Although the dog bite was serious and required medical attention, there is no medical evidence of multiple dog bites.
f. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
g. In summary, Skylstad failed to raise a triable issue for a jury on his claim of excessive force.
CASE: UNITED
STATES v MOHR
318 F. 3d 613 (Fourth Cir. 2003)
(U.S. Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit: Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia)
INITIAL CLAIM:
Excessive force, a Police Service Dog bite, on a compliant suspect.
Takoma Park (TP), Maryland, had a commercial burglary in progress
with two suspects seen on a roof. Prince George’s County (PGC), Maryland,
Police K-9 Officer Stephanie Mohr and her dog responded to assist the allied
agency, along with one other PGC K-9 unit.
The suspects were ordered off the roof. They complied. The two suspects were compliant with their hands in the air. They were surrounded by about nine officers, with guns drawn. A police helicopter was overhead, illuminating the suspects. Mohr had her dog with her, standing near the suspects.
The other PGC K-9 handler asked the TP on-scene Sergeant, “Sarge, can the dog get a bite?” The Sergeant responded, “Yes.” With
the suspects still being compliant, Mohr commanded her dog to bite one of
the suspects. One suspect was bit in the leg. That suspect fell to the ground,
screaming. The suspect was compliant, even while being bit. After a period
of time, Mohr removed the dog from the bite.
COURT’S RULINGS, FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
1) Evidence proved graphic demonstration that Mohr unreasonably released her dog on an innocent, unresisting young person.
2) In prosecuting Mohr for unlawfully releasing her police dog,
evidence of a subsequent release of a dog by Mohr was admissible to prove
Mohr’s willfulness. Evidence showed that on at least one other occasion, Mohr used her police dog in a way that violated a citizen’s
right to be free from the use of excessive force.
3) Mohr was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in Federal prison. Mohr remains there today.
4) The TP Sergeant was sentenced to 15 months in Federal prison.
5) The other officers testified for the government.
Created
and maintained by Terry Fleck. Contact: k9fleck@aol.com
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- 2008 Terry Fleck. All rights reserved.